SECURITIES-RULE 10b-5-CoRPOATE OUTSIDER MAY BE LIABLE
FOR FAILURE To DISCLOSE OR ABSTAIN UNDER RuLE lOb-5 BASED ON
EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE FIDUCIARY RELATIONSHIP- United States v.

Newman, 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981).
Corporate mergers, acquisitions and takeovers are an increasingly common phenomenon in today's business environment.' Typically, corporate securities, which are the targets of these moves, increase in value when information about the takeover or acquisition
plan is made public. 2 A question which frequently arises is whether
possessors of this information who trade in the securities before the
3
information becomes public are liable under federal law.
4
In United States v. Newman, the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit reinstated an indictment brought under section 10(b)
6
of the Securities Exchange Act of 19345 (the 1934 Act) and rule 10b-5

Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc., 384 F.2d 540, 544 (2d Cir. 1967); see also R.
& H. MARSH, SECURITIES REGULATION 736 (4th ed. 1977); Note, Cash Tender Offers:
Judicial Interpretationof Section 14(e), 23 CLEv. ST. L. Ray. 262 (1974).
2 United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12, 17 (2d Cir. 1981).
5A A. JAcoBs, THE IMPACT OF RuLE 10b-5, § 187, at 8-24 (rev. 1980).
664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981).
5 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976). Section 10(b) states that:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of
any national securities exchangeJENNINGS

(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale ot any security,
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and
regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the
public interest or for the protection of investors.
Id. Section 10(b) does not by itself make unlawful any conduct or activity but rather confers on
the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) rulemaking power to condemn deceptive practices in
the sale or purchase of securities. This is what rule 10b-5 does. Birnbaum v. Newport Steel
Corp., 193 F.2d 461, 463 (2d Cir. 1952).
6 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(1981). This rule, issued by the SEC under authority granted by
section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976), provides that:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of any facility of
any national securities exchange,
a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they are made, not misleading, or
c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale
of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1981).
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and held that an employee's fiduciary duty to his employer and its
clients imposes an affirmative duty either to disclose his knowledge of
an impending tender offer to prospective sellers of the target securities
or abstain from trading when he obtains this knowledge in the course
of his employment. 7 The defendant's misuse of information concerning planned tender offers is now clearly proscribed by rule 14e-3,
which was adopted subsequent to the acts charged in the indictment.8
By upholding the indictment under section 10(b) and rule lOb-5, the
Second Circuit broke new ground by finding for the first time that a
fiduciary duty owed to one person or entity was sufficient to form the
basis of a duty to disclose to a different person or entity.9
Between 1973 and 1978, E. Jacques Courtois and Adrian Antoniu, two employees of separate investment banking firms, allegedly
"misappropriated" confidential information' ° concerning planned
mergers and acquisitions which was entrusted to their employers by
corporate clients." They communicated this information to James
Mitchell Newman, a securities trader for a New York brokerage
firm.12 Newman, along with Franklin Carniol and Constantine Spy-

ropoulos,1 3 used the information to arrange stock purchases in compa-

1 664 F.2d at 16.
8 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3 (1981). The text of this rule is, in pertinent
part:
(a) If any person has taken a substantial step or steps to commence, or has
commenced, a tender offer (the "offering person"), it shall constitute a fraudulent,
deceptive or manipulative act or practice within the meaning of section 14(e) of the
Act for any other person who is in possession of material information relating to such
tender offer which information he knows or has reason to know is nonpublic and
which he knows or has reason to know has been acquired directly or indirectly from:
(1) The offering person,
(2) The issuer of the securities sought or to be sought by such tender offer, or
(3) Any officer, director, partner, or employee or any other person acting on
behalf of the offering person or such issuer, to purchase or sell or cause to be
purchased or sold any of such securities or any securities convertible into or exchangeable for any such securities or any option or right to obtain or to dispose of
any of the foregoing securities, unless within a reasonable time prior to any purchase
or sale such information and its source are publicly disclosed by press release or
otherwise.
Id.
, 664 F.2d at 15.
"I Since the district court had made no findings of fact for purposes of the appeal, the court

assumed the facts alleged in the indictment to be true. Id.; see United States v. Von Barta, 635
F.2d 999 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 998 (1981).
11 664 F.2d at 15. Both Courtois and Antoniu were employed by Morgan, Stanley & Co.,
Inc. between 1972 and 1975. Antoniu left Morgan, Stanley to work for Kuhn Loeb & Co., now
known as Lehman Brothers Kuhn Loeb, Inc., in 1975. Id.
12 Id.
1IId. Carniol was a Belgian resident and Spyropoulos was a Greek citizen living in Greece
and France. Id.
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nies which were targets of these mergers and takeover bids.14 When
the mergers and takeovers were announced, the value of the stocks
greatly increased and the three realized substantial gains.' 5 Courtois
and Antoniu, the original sources of the secret information, shared in
these profits. 1I
Courtois, Newman, Carniol and Spyropoulos17 were indicted on
thirteen counts of violating section 10(b)1 8 and rule 10b-5,'9 thirteen
22
counts of mail fraud 20 and with conspiracy 2' to commit these acts.
The securities fraud charges were based primarily on the defendants'

1' Id. In an effort to conceal these transactions, secret foreign bank accounts were used and
the purchases were spread among the brokers. Id.
Is Id.
16 Id.
'7 Antoniu was an unindicted co-conspirator who cooperated with the government. United
States v. Courtois, No. S-81 Cr.53, slip op. at 2 (S.D.N.Y. June 5, 1981), rev'd sub nom. United
States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981).
Is See supra note 5 for text of statute.
I" See supra note 6 for text of rule. Newman was named in seven of these counts. United
States v. Courtois, No. S-81 Cr.53, slip op. at 3 (S.D.N.Y. June 5, 1981), rev'd sub nom. United
States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981).
20 The charges alleged violations of the mail fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1976). This
statute provides that:
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to
defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises, or to sell, dispose of, loan, exchange, alter, give
away, distribute, supply, or furnish or procure for unlawful use any counterfeit or
spurious coin, obligation, security, or other article, or anything represented to be or
intimated or held out to be such counterfeit or spurious article, for the purpose of
executing such scheme or artifice or attempting so to do, places in any post office or
authorized depository for mail matter, any matter or thing whatever to be sent or
delivered by the Postal Service, or takes or receives therefrom, any such matter or
thing, or knowingly causes to be delivered by mail according to the direction
thereon, or at the place at which it is directed to be delivered by the person to whom
it is addressed, any such matter or thing, shall be fined not more than $1,000 or
imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
Id.
Newman was named in seven of these counts. United States v. Courtois, No. S-81 Cr. 53,
slip op. at 3 (S.D.N.Y. June 5, 1981), rev'd sub noma. United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12 (2d
Cir. 1981).
21 These charges alleged violations of 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1976) which provides:
If two or more persons conspire either to commit any offense against the United
States, or to defraud the United States, or any agency thereof in any manner or for
any purpose, and one or more of such persons do any act to effect the object of the
conspiracy, each shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than
five years, or both.
If, however, the offense, the commission of which is the object of the conspiracy, is a misdemeanor only, the punishment for such conspiracy shall not exceed the
maximum punishment provided for such misdemeanor.
Id.
22 664 F.2d at 14.
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breach of a fiduciary duty to the investment firms and their clients.2 3
Newman thereafter moved in the District Court for the Southern
District of New York to dismiss the indictment relative to him contending that the acts charged did not24violate any federal criminal
statute at the time of their occurrence.
Judge Haight granted the motion, concluding "that 'there was no
"clear and definite statement" in the federal securities laws which
both antedated and proscribed the acts alleged in [the] indictment,' so
as to give the defendant a reasonable opportunity to know that his
conduct was prohibited. ' 25 He also dismissed the mail fraud counts
for failing, as a matter of law, to charge a crime.26 Accordingly, the
corresponding conspiracy counts were also dismissed .27
In reversing the dismissal, the Second Circuit held that the indictment did allege acts and circumstances which fell within the area
protected by section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 28 It also reinstated the mail
29
fraud and conspiracy charges.
Disparate views regarding the nature of rule 10b-5 liability have
led to conflicting judicial interpretations of the rule. Since its adoption
in 1942, rule lOb-5 has generated a wealth of controversy concerning
its appropriate scope. 30 This controversy embraces widely divergent
theories of liability, ranging from the position that any person is liable
for perpetrating fraud upon another if he trades securities without

23

United States v.Courtois, No. S-81 Cr.53, slip op. at 9 (S.D.N.Y. June 5, 1981), rev'd sub

nom. United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981). Specifically, the duties of honesty,
loyalty, and silence were breached. Id.
24 664 F.2d at 3, 13. During the lower court proceedings, Newman was the sole defendant
within the court's jurisdiction. 664 F.2d at 15. His three co-defendants had fled the United
States. United States v. Courtois, No. S-81 Cr.53, slip op. at 38 app. 1 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. June 5,
1981), rev'd sub nom. United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981).
25 664 F.2d at 14 (quoting United States v. Courtois, No. S-81 Cr.53, slip op. at 22 (S.D.N.Y.
June 5, 1981), rev'd sub nom. United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981)).
26 Id.
27

Id.

Id. at 15.
Id. In June of 1982, James Mitchell Newman was tried and convicted on all counts.
Telephone conference with Franklin Velie, Esq., attorney for the defendant (July 7, 1982). He
was sentenced to serve one year and one day in prison on each of 13 counts, all prison terms to
run concurrently. On two other counts he received a suspended sentence and was placed on
probation for three years. He was fined $10,000 and, as part of his probation, required to
participate in some public service work. He is appealing the conviction. Telephone conference
with Rose Marie Fugnetti, Clerk (Oct. 20, 1982).
30 See, e.g., Crane, An Analysis of Causation Under Rule 10b-5, 9 SEC. Rxc. L.J. 99 (1981);
Fischel, Secondary Liability Under Section 10(b) of the Securities Act of 1934, 69 CAL. L. REv.
80 (1981); Note, The Ninth Circuit Expands the 10b-5 Net to Catch a Columnist-Zweig v.
Hearst Corporation, 29 DE PAUL L. REv. 287 (1979); Note, Omission and Nondisclosure Under
SEC Rule 10b-5: A Distinction in Search of a Difference, 7 FORDHAM Ura. L.J. 423 (1979).
21

29
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revealing all material information he possesses relative to the transaction, 31 to the proposition that even insider trading 32 should not be
circumscribed by rule lOb-5's reach.3 3 The problem is compounded by
the tension between the generally recognized view that since federal
securities laws are remedial in nature 34 they are intended to be construed "flexibly, not technically and restrictively, ' 35 and a sound reluctance on the part of the courts to impute more to the laws than they
3
actually contain.
Rule 10b-5 expressly prohibits affirmative acts of fraud by any
person in connection with the purchase or sale of securities. 37 The
language of the statute attaches no relevance to the relationship between the issuing corporation, the offender, and those with whom he
deals. 38 Moreover, the rule does not address situations involving pure
silence. 39 For that reason, a judicially created rule requiring persons in
possession of material nonpublic information to either disclose that
information to those with whom they trade or abstain from trading
has evolved to cover situations in which silence operates in the same
way as overt acts of fraud. 40 Known as the disclose-or-abstain rule, it
31 Brudney, Insiders, Outsiders, and InformationalAdvantages Under the FederalSecurities
Laws, 93 HARv. L. REv. 322, 339-40 (1979). This theory embodies a belief that "parity of
information" should exist among all participants in the marketplace. See also SEC v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur, 401 F.2d 833, 851-52 (2d Cir. 1968)(en bane), cert. denied sub nom. Kline v. Securities
& Exch. Comm., 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
32 "Insider trading" has been defined as trading engaged in by officers, directors, and large
(10 %) shareholders. Manne, Insider Trading and the Administrative Process, 35 GEo. WASH. L.
REv. 473, 474 (1967). This definition derives from section 16(b) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. §
78p(b) (1976). The definition of "insider" is not, however, mechanical. In re Cady, Roberts &
Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961), established that insider status results from being an officer, director,
controlling shareholder or from standing in a special relationship with a corporation, thereby
having access to information intended to be available only for a corporate purpose. Id. at 912.
33 Barry, The Economics of Outside Information and Rule 10b-5, 129 U. PA. L. REv. 1307,
1328-29 (1981) (citing H. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKrT (1966)). For a more
balanced approach, see Fleischer, Mundheim & Murphy, An Initial Inquiry into the Responsibility to Disclose Market Information, 121 U. PA. L. REv. 798 (1973).
34 See In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 910 (1961).
31 Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 475-76 (1977); see also Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 197, 199 (1976).
36 Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 748-49 (1975); Santa Fe Indus. v.
Green, 430 U.S. 462, 472 (1977). That judicial decisions may need to" 'put a limiting gloss upon
the statutory language' "is by no means a novel idea. Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 112
(1974) (quoting Manual Enterprises v. Day, 370 U.S. 478, 484 (1962)).
37 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1981), the text of which is set forth in note 6 supra. The terms
"employ," "make," and "engage" clearly connote behavior which manifests itself in an external
fashion. Even the prohibition against "omit[ting] to state a material fact," id. § 240.10b-5(b),
operates only when other statements have already been made. See In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40
S.E.C. 907, 911 (1961).
31 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1981).
39 See supra note 6 for text of the rule.
40 See In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 911 (1961). In the context of rule 10b-5,
disclosure must be made only of material, nonpublic information. Id. The basic test of the
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was designed to prevent corporate insiders from benefiting from "the
inherent unfairness involved where a party takes advantage of .. .
information knowing it is unavailable to those with whom he is
dealing. "41
The provisions of the Securities Act of 1933 (the 1933 Act) and
the 1934 Act both incorporated 42 and superseded 43 the relevant common law principles. 44 The antifraud provisions of each 45 were aimed

information's materiality is whether a reasonable person would attach importance to it in
determining his choice of action in the transaction. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d
833, 849 (2d Cir. 1968) (enbanc), cert. denied sub nom. Kline v. Securities & Exch. Comm., 394
U.S. 976 (1969); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 538(2) (1977).
Disclose-or-abstain was formulated to apply to inside information. In re Cady, Roberts &
Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 & n.15 (1961). Inside information is nonpublic information that belongs
to and emanates from the corporation whose securities are traded. Barry, supra note 32, at 130809. This is distinguishable from "market information" which is"information about events or
circumstances which affect the market for a company's securities but which do not affect the
company's assets or earning power." Fleischer, Mundheim & Murphy, supra note 33, at 799.
At least one commentator has argued persuasively that this distinction is unimportant and
that the relevant inquiry is whether the information is material and nonpublic. See Brudney,
supra note 31, at 329-33. Nevertheless, in this case Newman was not a corporate insider since he
had no special relationship to the issuing corporation. He was an outsider who traded on market,
not inside, material nonpublic information. To date, disclose-or-abstain liability under rule lOb5 has been invoked in this type of situation only once, and on appeal was rejected by the Supreme
Court. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980). These facts implicate the idea that
Newman was deprived of the fair notice required by due process that his acts were unlawful
under rule lOb-5.
In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 (1961).
42 See Comment, Duty to Disclose Inside Information Arises From a Fiduciary or Special
Relationship Between Parties to a Securities Transaction, 58 WASH. U.L.Q. 1013, 1015-16
(1980).
"3See In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 910 (1961).
44 At common law, a duty to disclose existed only where the parties to a transaction stood in a
confidential or fiduciary relation to each other. See W. PnOSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
ToRTs § 106, at 697 (4th ed. 1971). Prior to passage of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §
77(a) (1976), plaintiffs bringing securities fraud actions had to depend on common law tort
theories of deceit or general fraud. Brooks, Rule 10b-5 in the Balance: An Analysis of the
Supreme Court's Policy Perspective, 32 HASTING L.J. 403, 405-06 & n.10 (1980). This dependence influenced later judicial consideration of the 1933 and 1934 Acts. Chiarella v. United
States, 445 U.S. 222, 227-28 (1980); SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 19294 (1963). But see Brooks, supra, at 410 (indicating that this impact was insubstantial before
1975).
Historically, the relationship between a corporate director or officer and a shareholder did
not entail a duty to disclose. Brooks, supra, at 407. In the early part of this century, the Supreme
Court imposed a disclosure obligation in those circumstances without disturbing the general rule
that only where a confidential or fiduciary relationship bound the parties did a duty to disclose
arise. See Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419 (1909). In adopting the theretofore distinctly minority
viewpoint, the Strong decision sanctioned the "special facts" doctrine which supported that
viewpoint. This doctrine provided that even if relations between directors and shareholders of a
corporation ordinarily were not of a fiduciary nature such as to require disclosure before trading,
special facts or circumstances surrounding a transaction could compel disclosure. Id. at 431.
45 Section 10(b)'s counterpart in the 1933 Act is section 17(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1976).
Section 17(a)'s text virtually parallels that of rule lOb-5. The difference between the two is that
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at staunching fraudulent activities "whether or not [those activities
were] precisely and technically sufficient to sustain a common law
action for fraud and deceit." 46 In Strong v. Repide, 47 a pre-Act holding, the Supreme Court held that nondisclosure of inside information
by corporate directors purchasing the corporation's stock from its
stockholders amounted to fraud under common law principles. 48 This
led the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the courts to
impose an affirmative duty of disclosure under rule lOb-5 upon corporate directors, officers, and controlling stockholders. 4
In re Cady, Roberts & Co. 50 was the first case to articulate
disclose-or-abstain and to formulate a flexible definition of the term
"insider." Disclose-or-abstain requires that the possessor of material,
nonpublic information obtained by virtue of his position must either
disclose that information to those with whom he deals or abstain from
dealing in those securities. 5 1 The term "insider" includes "those persection 17(a) forbids fraud in "the offer or sale" of a security, while rule lOb-5 addresses
purchases as well as sales.
46 In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 910 (1961). Indeed, the SEC regarded the
securities acts as the source of "a wholly new and far-reaching body of Federal corporation law."
Id.
47 213 U.S. 419 (1909).
48 Id. at 431.
"8 E.g., Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808 (D. Del. 1951); Kardon v. National
Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798, modified, 83 F. Supp. 613 (E.D. Pa. 1947); In re Ward La
France Truck Corp., 13 S.E.C. 373 (1943). This development was expressly recognized in In re
Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 911 & n.13 (1961).
-o40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
51 Id. at 911. The SEC articulated the rule as follows:
[I]nsiders must disclose material facts which are known to them by virtue of their
position but which are not known to persons with whom they deal and which, if
known, would affect their investment judgment. Failure to make disclsoure in these
circumstances constitutes a violation of the anti-fraud provisions. If, on the other
hand, disclosure prior to effecting a purchase or sale would be improper or unrealistic under the circumstances, we believe the alternative is to forego the transaction.
Id. This language in Cady, Roberts has been given an expansive interpretation, most notably by
the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d
Cir. 1968)(en banc), cert. denied sub nom. Kline v. Securities & Exch. Comm., 394 U.S. 976
(1969). Many commentators argue that the holding of Cady, Roberts was based on the principle
of fairness. See, e.g., Brudney, supra note 31, at 346. This is true to a point, but cannot obscure
the fact that Cady, Roberts expressly predicates the duty to disclose or abstain upon a relationship giving access to material, nonpublic information. 40 S.E.C. at 912. The unfairness discussed
in Cady, Roberts results from a breach of the duty to disclose or abstain but it does not create the
duty. Id.
It is important to remember in analyzing Cady, Roberts that the fiduciary obligation arose
because the one obligated was deemed an insider by reason of "a relationship giving access,
directly or indirectly, to information intended to be available only for a corporate purpose and
not for the personal benefit of anyone." Id. Therefore, even though Cady, Roberts extended the
meaning of the term "insider" to corporate employees who may not have been officially designated as officers or directors, and to corporate agents, and to "tippees" of either, it did not
discard the insider requirement when applying disclose-or-abstain.
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sons who are in a special relationship with a company and privy to its
internal affairs," as well as the traditional categories of directors,
officers, and controlling shareholders. 52 An integral element of an
insider's duty to disclose is that he acquire his information by virtue of
his position vis-2i-vis the issuing corporation.
53
When the Second Circuit decided SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur,
it altered the basic qualifications of an insider. Whereas Cady, Roberts had rooted insider status in a special relationship to the issuing
corporation, Texas Gulf Sulphur held that mere possession of material
inside information compelled disclosure. 54 Thus, no special relationship to the corporation was necessary. 55 After acknowledging that
disclose-or-abstain was based upon traditional fiduciary concepts or
the "special facts" doctrine, 56 the Second Circuit then concluded that
the principle applied to anyone in possession of material inside information. 57 Thus, the court's effective repudiation of the insider requirement potentially allowed a person with no relationship to the
issuing corporation to be held liable for failing to disclose under rule
lOb-5 if he somehow managed to come into possession of material
inside information.
While the Texas Gulf Sulphur court stated that it had derived
this rule from Cady, Roberts, 58 that case does not support such an
interpretation since its holding was limited to insiders. 59 Apparently,
the Second Circuit justified its abandonment of the insider prerequisite with the conviction that rule lOb-5 was "based in policy on the
justifiable expectation of the securities marketplace that all investors
trading on impersonal exchanges have relatively equal access to material information." 6 Moreover, the court went so far as to declare that
parity-of-information 6 ' was the purpose of rule lOb-5,6 2 a position the
" 40 S.E.C. at 912. The sentence concludes thus: "and thereby suffer correlative duties in
trading in its securities." Id. (emphasis supplied). This indicates that the rationale is aimed at
those situations where the traded securities belong to the corporation to which the obliged trader
is an insider.
-3 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968)(en bane), cert. denied sub nom. Kline v. Securities & Exch.
Comm., 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
4 Id. at 848.
55 Id.

56 Id. The "special facts" doctrine originated in Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419, 431 (1909).
See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
51 401 F.2d at 848. The court consistently characterized the information as "inside." Considering the extensive reach of the rationale, however, it is reasonable to conclude that the Second
Circuit made no fine distinction between "inside" information and "market" information and
that the resultant rule would actually encompass all material, nonpublic information.
'

Id.

See supra notes 49-51 and accompanying text.
60 401 F.2d at 848.
e See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
6' See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d at 851-52.
'9
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Supreme Court categorically rejected in a later case.6 3 Further, the
Second Circuit's broad interpretation of disclose-or-abstain in Texas
Gulf Sulphur was unnecessary since the facts were confined to an
6 4
insider situation.
65
the Court of Appeals for the
In United States v. Chiarella,
Second Circuit affirmed the defendant's conviction for criminal violation of rule lOb-5 by relying on the rule it established in Texas Gulf
Sulphur that anyone possessing material inside information was required to either disclose or abstain. This decision was later reversed by
the Supreme Court."6 In keeping with the Texas Gulf Sulphur rule,
the court of appeals deemed it "irrelevant" that Chiarella was not an
insider of the corporation whose securities he traded because, as a
financial printer, he was "as inside the market itself as one could
be."'6 7 The Second Circuit then articulated a test of "regular access to
market information," holding that anyone regularly receiving material, nonpublic information was forbidden to trade on the basis of it
without honoring an affirmative duty of disclosure. 8
In his dissenting opinion in Chiarella,6 9 Judge Meskill departed
from the majority for reasons which formed part of the basis for Judge
Haight's dismissal of Newman's indictment. 70 The dissent found it
particularly significant that no case put forth by the Government
imposed criminal liability on anyone, insider or outsider, for section
10(b) nondisclosure. Even civil cases, Judge Meskill noted, restricted
nondisclosure liability to insiders, their tippees 7' or those standing "in
a special relationship with other traders. "72
01 Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 233 (1980). The ChiarellaCourt also rejected the
theory that a duty to disclose arises from mere possession of nonpublic market information. Id. at
235. This would seem to repudiate the Second Circuit's theory enunciated in SEC v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur, 401 F.2d at 848, that mere possession of material inside information results in a duty to
disclose unless this duty hinges on the distinction between market information and inside
information. See supra note 40.
61 At least one commentator has argued that courts, litigants, and commentators have
interpreted rule lOb-5 in the same manner as they would a congressional statute and that this is
"an indefensible approach to an administrative regulation." Manne, supra note 32, at 474.
05 588 F.2d 1358 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd, 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
6 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
67 588 F.2d at 1364.
61 Id. at 1365. Had the Second Circuit's decision been affirmed, this would have resolved the
question whether material inside information, or material market information, or both, give rise
to a duty to disclose based on possession alone. See supra notes 40 & 63.
588 F.2d at 1373 (Meskill, J., dissenting).
70 United States v. Courtois, No. S-81 Cr. 53, slip op. at 19 (S.D.N.Y. June 5, 1981), rev'd
sub noma.United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981).
71A tippee is a person who receives material nonpublic information from an insider. Comment, supra note 42, at 1017 n.31.
12 588 F.2d at 1373 (Meskill, J.,dissenting).
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The dissent asserted that fraud under rule lOb-5 did not include
all breaches of fiduciary duty involving securities transactions. 73 Judge
Meskill could not uphold Chiarella's conviction because to do so
would inappropriately stretch existing law to close a gap which should
74
properly be remedied by an SEC rule or by congressional legislation.
Further, the dissent stressed that Chiarella was deprived of fair notice
that his conduct was criminal because neither the statute's language,
nor prior judicial interpretation, or established custom and usage
provided such notice. 75 Finally, Judge Meskill concluded that circumstances sufficient to create a duty to disclose did not arise in situations
involving only regular receipt of market information, absent a con76
gressional enactment or an SEC rule.
The Supreme Court in Chiarellav. United States77 agreed with
Judge Meskill that the Second Circuit's expanded application of disclose-or-abstain to a purchaser in Chiarella's position must be rejected. 78 To do otherwise, the Court reasoned, would be to recognize
"a general duty between all participants in market transactions to forgo actions based on material, nonpublic information. ' 79 The
ChiarellaCourt also remarked that neither the SEC nor Congress had
language and
adopted a parity of information rule; moreover the
80
legislative history of rule lOb-5 did not warrant one.
The Court stipulated that a duty to disclose must emanate from a
specific relationship between two parties.8 1 Since Chiarella owed no
duty to the sellers of the securities he purchased, 8 2 the Supreme Court

73 Id. at 1375 (Meskill, J., dissenting). This point was ignored altogether by the Second
Circuit in Newman.
74 Id. at 1376 (Meskill, J., dissenting).
15Id. at 1377 (Meskill, J., dissenting). Judge Haight adopted that point in his opinion.
United States v. Courtois, No. S-81 Cr. 53, slip op. at 7 (S.D.N.Y. June 5, 1981), rev'd sub nom.
United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981).
7' 588 F.2d at 1378 (Meskill, J.,dissenting).
77 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
78 Id. at 232-33.
79 Id. at 233.
80 Id. Further, the Chiarella Court noted that "administrative and judicial interpretations
[had] established that silence in connection with the purchase or sale of securities may operate as
a fraud actionable under § 10(b) .. .[only if] premised upon a duty to disclose arising from a
relationship of trust and confidence between parties to a transaction." Id. at 230.
1 Id. at 233.
82 The Supreme Court found that:

[n]o duty could arise from petitioner's relationship with the sellers of the target
company's securities, for petitioner had no prior dealings with them. He was not
their agent, he was not a fiduciary, he was not a person in whom the sellers had
placed their trust and confidence. He was, in fact, a complete stranger who dealt
with the sellers only through impersonal market transactions.
Id. at 232-33.
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concluded that he could not be guilty of fraud based on pure silence.8 3
The Court expressly declined to decide whether Chiarella had
breached a duty to the acquiring corporation when he acted upon
information obtained through his position as employee of the acquiring corporation's hired printing house, because this theory had
not been presented to the jury at the trial.8 4 Consequently, the Court
reserved the issue which the Second Circuit faced in Newman. 85
The district court's dismissal of the securities charges in Newman
was based on an absence of fair notice to the defendants that their acts
were criminal under rule 10b-5. 86 Although such conduct is now
clearly unlawful under rule 14e-3, 87 Judge Haight decided that at the
time Newman acted "neither courts, commentators, nor the SEC in its
rule-making or enforcement capacities had stated that rule lOb-5
extended to a non-insider's breach of a fiduciary duty owed to the
acquiring corporation in a tender offer." 8 Consequently, the court
concluded that the imposition of a criminal sanction would be improper. 8 9
Judge Haight began his analysis of the securities fraud by considering the result in Chiarella v. United States.9 0 Chiarella was convicted for his failure to disclose his knowledge to the sellers of target
company shares9 ' but the Supreme Court reversed the conviction
because it found that Chiarella was under no obligation to those
sellers. Like Chiarella, Newman was indicted for his failure to disclose, but this requirement was based on a duty owed to the employer
investment firms and their clients rather than a duty owed to the
sellers. 2 Judge Haight found that rule lOb-5 was not intended and did
not properly apply to situations which did not involve corporate
insiders and that the employer-employee relationship was not of the
93
kind encompassed by the rule.

83

Id. at 233.

11 Id. at 235-36.
Is Id. at 236. In Newman, the issue was framed in terms of a breach of duty to the employer
as well as to the clients. 664 F.2d at 16.
"' United States v. Courtois, No. S-81 Cr. 53, slip op. at 22 (S.D.N.Y. June 5, 1981), rev'd
sub nom. United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981).
87 Id. at 13.
88 Id. at 22. The acquiring corporations in this case were the investment firm's clients.
8 Id. at 24.
-0445 U.S. 222 (1980).
91 United States v. Courtois, No. S-81 Cr. 53, slip op. at 4-5 (S.D.N.Y. June 5, 1981), rev'd
sub nom. United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981).
92 Id. at 9.
93 Id. at 14, 17-20.
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To extend rule 10b-5 sanctions to a breach of a fiduciary duty
owed to an employer added, in the court's view, " 'a gloss to the
operative language of the statute quite different from its commonly
accepted meaning.' -4 This extension was unwarranted, Judge
Haight continued, because Newman was not an insider of the target
corporation acting on inside information. 9 5 The companies whose
securities he traded were not the companies to whom he allegedly
owed a fiduciary duty."' Therefore, the district court concluded that
the connection between the fiduciary duty and the fraudulent trading, which was required after Chiarella, was absent in Newman's
case.

97

The district court considered three factors to be of prime importance in deciding the fair notice question. First, the SEC had expressly
refused to employ rule 10b-5 to prohibit the similar activity of warehousing.98 Second, SEC statements anticipating a need for rule 14e-3
lacked any reference to rule lOb-5's applicability to non-inside,
market information."9 Third, prior to the time Newman acted, liability for nondisclosure under rule lOb-5 was found only in circumstances where the offender was a corporate insider who breached a
fiduciary duty to a purchasing or selling shareholder.10 0
Warehousing is the practice whereby a prospective tender offeror
leaks advance knowledge of its plans to friendly investors who then
buy the targeted shares for later sale to the offeror.' 0° This conduct
paralleled Newman's actions in a fundamental manner, according to
Judge Haight, because it involved the trading of a target company's
securities on the basis of nonpublic information by an investor unrela-

Id. at 10 (quoting Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 472 (1977)).
"I Id. at 11.
91 Id. at 11-12. The lower court found support for this interpretation in the SEC's decision in
In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961), as well. United States v. Courtois, No. S-81
Cr. 53, slip op. at 12 (S.D.N.Y. June 5, 1981), rev'd sub nora. United States v. Newman, 664
F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981).
11 United States v. Courtois, No. S-81 Cr. 53, slip op. at 10-11 (S.D.N.Y. June 5, 1981), rev'd
sub nor. United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981). Judge Haight reasoned from his
examination of Chiarella that actionable fraud in a securities transaction where the alleged
fraudulent act is an omission must rest on a duty to disclose. Id. at 10. That duty derived from a
"special relationship," an insider status, as Cady, Roberts pointed out. Id. Such a special
relationship had been confined to situations involving corporate insiders (or their tippees) and
inside information. Id. at 10-11. Since Newman was not an insider and inside information was
not involved, Judge Haight concluded that rule lOb-5 did not apply. Id. at 11-12.
o Id. at 14.
o Id. at 14, 17.
94

1o0Id. at 14.
101 Id.
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ted to that company. 10 2 The district court noted that the SEC had
excluded warehousing from the ambit of rule 10b-5 for the very
reason that there existed no relationship to the target company and
thus no fiduciary duty between the purchaser and the selling sharethat rule 10b-5 could
holder. 103 Consequently, Judge Haight decided
10 4
not apply to Newman's behavior either.
The district court stated that when the SEC solicited public
comment regarding the extent to which nonpublic market information should be disclosed before trading, and when it issued statements
heralding the promulgation of rule 14e-3, it failed to mention rule
10b-5 in this context.10 5 This indicated to Judge Haight that the SEC
assumed that a hole existed in the securities laws that was not already
filled by rule 1Ob-5.1°6
Judge Haight examined numerous recent actions brought under
rule 10b-5 which the Government argued constituted notice to Newman that the rule encompassed his particular conduct. 07 Most of these
were complaints, consent decrees and a plea to an indictment. 0 8 Since
they were "unlitigated," the district court decided that they lacked
"precedential value" 109 and thus were legally insufficient as "clear and
definite statement[s] of the conduct proscribed."" 0
The district court next reviewed the case law relied upon by the
Government."' Because one group of proffered cases either adhered
to a "traditional insider analysis" 112 or did not reach the issue of a noninsider's culpability under rule lOb-5, 1 3 the court decided they were
inapposite to the theory of the instant indictment. 1 4 Judge Haight

102
103
104

Id. at 14-15.
Id. at 15.
Id. at 16.

105Id. at 17. An American Bar Association Comment Letter also influenced the court. The
letter stated that "not every failure to disclose material information constitutes a violation of the
anti-fraud rules. There remains the requirement that the non-disclosure either renders some
other statement misleading or itself comprises part of an artifice or course of business operating
as a fraud upon the other party in the transaction." ABA Comm. Letter on Material, Non-Public
Information (Oct. 15, 1973), reprintedin SEc. REc. & L. REP. (BNA) (No. 233) D-1, at D-6 (Jan.
2, 1974).
'0 United States v. Courtois, No. S-81 Cr. 53, slip op. at 17 (S.D.N.Y. June 5, 1981), rev'd
sub nom. United Stated v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981).
107 Id. at 18-19.
100 Id. at 19.
109 Id.
110 Id. at 20.
"I Id.
112

13
114

Id. at

14, 20.
Id. at 21.

Id. at 20.

1982]

NOTES

distinguished another group of cases which "treated 'misappropriation' as fraud" on the ground that they concerned theft of actual
securities or their proceeds resulting in damage to the defrauded party
in its capacity as an investor, whereas Newman's misappropriation
injured the investment firms and their clients in their role as employers.1 5 For these reasons, the district court concluded that when Newman traded on the basis of confidential market information, the
securities laws did not mandate disclosure. 16 Consequently, Judge
7
Haight dismissed the indictment with respect to rule lOb-5."
With respect to the mail fraud charges, the district court based its
dismissal of those counts in large part upon the Second Circuit's
decision in United States v. Von Barta"8 which rejected the theory
that the mail fraud statute is violated by any intentional breach of
fiduciary honesty and loyalty on the part of an employee in furtherance of a scheme for pecuniary gain." 9 Judge Haight relied upon
United States v. Regent Office Supply Co., 20 which he said required
the Government to prove that the defendant at least "contemplated"
some actual harm or injury to the victim, though proof of actual
injury was unnecessary.'
Finally, the district court ruled that dismissal of the conspiracy charge "necessarily follow[ed]" dismissal of
the substantive counts because criminal conspiracy could not be based
22
upon noncriminal actions.
In United States v. Newman, the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit set out to resolve a question left unanswered by the Supreme
Court in Chiarellav. United States. 23 The Chiarella Court declined
to decide whether, in a securities transaction, a fiduciary duty to an
employer created a duty to disclose confidential information obtained
"' Id. at 21-22. Judge Haight decided that the injury suffered by the investment firms and
their clients as employers was properly redressed under state law. Id. at 22. The Supreme Court
discussed the question whether state or federal law should control a given securities transaction
in Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 477-80 (1977). The Court made it abundantly clear
that "a wide variety of corporate conduct [is] traditionally left to state regulation." Id. at 478.
" 'Corporations are creatures of state law, and investors commit their funds to corporate directors on the understanding that, except where federal law expressly requires certain responsibilities of directors with respect to stockholders, state law will govern the internal affairs of the
corporation.' " Id. at 479 (quoting Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 84 (1975)).
1' United States v. Courtois, No. 30-81 Cr. 53, slip op. at 24 (S.D.N.Y. June 5, 1981), rev'd sub
nom. United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981).
17 Id.
"8 635 F.2d 999 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 998 (1981).
'IQ Id. at 1002.
120 421 F.2d 1174 (2d Cir. 1970).
2I United States v. Courtois, No. S-81 Cr. 53, slip op. at 28 (S.D.N.Y. June 5, 1981), rev'd
sub nom. United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981).
122 Id. at 37.
121 664 F.2d at 15.
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in the course of employment to a prospective purchaser or seller.1 24
Judge Van Graafeiland, writing for the majority in Newman,
answered that question in the affirmative and held that the alleged
actions of these defendants were criminal under rule 10b-5 even
though their employers were not "at the time . . . purchaser[s] or
seller[s] of the target company securities in any transaction with any
25
of the defendants."
The court of appeals concentrated on two aspects of the lower
court opinion in determining that Newman had notice that his behavior was subject to rule 10b-5 sanctions. Initially, the Newman court
considered whether, under rule 10b-5, an actual purchaser or seller
must be defrauded. 2 Then, the court examined whether the "misappropriation" was plainly the type of fraud which rule 10b-5 was
27
intended to remedy.1
Judge Van Graafeiland scrutinized the language of the rule and
remarked that it did not specifically require that fraud be perpetrated
upon a buyer or seller of securities. 28 He noted, however, that courts
have implied this requirement for the purpose of conferring standing
to sue in private causes of action for damages. 2 9 Since this was a
criminal case rather than a civil damage action, the court decided that
a plaintiffs standing to sue was not relevant. 30 Therefore, Newman
could not invoke this limitation to shield himself from rule 10b-5
liability. 131
The Newman court thereafter focused on prior case law in exploring the confines of fraud under rule 10b-5.1 32 Judge Van
124 445 U.S. at 236-37.

125664 F.2d at 16. Newman, Carniol and Spyropoulos were not investment firm employees
but their liability derived from their aid, participation in, and facilitation of the violation of
Courtois' and Antoniu's primary fiduciary duty. Id. The essence of that duty was the "honesty,
loyalty and silence" owed directly to Morgan, Stanley, Kuhn, Loeb and their clients. Id.
26 Id. at 17.
7 Id. at 18.
I2 at 17.
Id.
429

Id. The court commented that:

it is only because the judiciary has created a private cause of action for damages the
'contours' of which are not described in the statute, that standing in such cases has
become a pivotal issue. The courts, not the Congress, have limited Rule 10b-5 suits
for damages to the purchasers and sellers of securities.
Id. (citation omitted).
130 Id.
131 Id.

131Id. Judge Van Graafeiland alluded to Chief Justice Burger's dissent in Chiarella wherein
he stated that the defendant " 'misappropriated-stole to put it bluntly-valuable nonpublic
information entrusted to him in the utmost confidence.' " Id. (quoting 445 U.S. at 245 (Burger,
C.J., dissenting)). The Newman court stated that these words "aptly describ[ed] the conduct of
the connivers in the instant case." 664 F.2d at 17. Oddly, neither court considered the irony of
the misappropriation theory in the context of lOb-5 disclose or abstain. It is somewhat illogical to
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Graafeiland found that damage to an investment firm's reputation
and the wrongful loss of its employees' honesty and loyalty resulting
from the misappropriation of confidential information in order to
make a securities transaction was essentially the same as a theft of an
employer's cash or securities. 33 He also found that since misappropriation of confidential information by a fiduciary was consistently
held to be unlawful in other areas of the law,13 4 Newman should have
known that his actions were proscribed by the "Securities Acts." 35
The court then considered Newman's argument that his fraud
was not linked to the buying or selling of securities within the meaning
of rule lOb-5. 3 The Newman court invoked the broad "touch" test
enunciated by the Supreme Court in Superintendent of Insurance v.
Banker's Life & Casualty 37 which "construed the phrase 'in connection with' flexibly to include deceptive practices 'touching' the sale of
securities." 38 The court decided that the fraud alleged in the indictment was sufficiently "in connection with" the purchase or sale of
securities to satisfy the rule because Newman's only reason for misappropriating the secret information was to buy stocks in target companies.139 In effect, Judge Van Graafeiland discounted the purchaserseller requirement which the district court held was integral to
fraudulent nondisclosure under rule 10b-5 and alternatively relied
upon the indisputably deceptive nature of Newman's conduct. Based
on this analysis, he concluded that the defendant had "clear notice"
0
that his nondisclosure violated rule lOb-5.14
Turning to the lower court's dismissal of the mail fraud charges,
the court of appeals stated that the district court had misconstrued its
prior holdings involving employee misappropriation of confidential
information and the use of the mails. 14 ' The Newman court distin-

posit the fact that one who possesses information to which he has no right can create in another a
right to possess it also.
133 Id.
134 Id. at 18.
135 Id. Interestingly, the Second Circuit did not state that Newman should have known that
his conduct was proscribed specifically by section 10(b) and rule 10b-5. This ignores the very
point made by Judge Haight in the district court opinion that if Newman's conduct violated the
federal securities laws at all, it violated section 14(e), not rule 10b-5. The Second Circuit failed to
take into account the Supreme Court's ruling that not every breach of duty of a fiduciary is
cognizable under section 10(b) and rule 10b-5. Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 476
(1977).
13 664 F.2d at 18.
" 404 U.S. 6 (1971).
138 664 F.2d at 18 (quoting Superintendent of Insurance, 404 U.S. at 12). The court observed
approvingly that even a "tenuous" connection between the deception and the securities would
satisfy the test. Id. at 18.
139

Id.

14oId. at 19.
141

Id.
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guished the case of United States v. Von Barta, relied upon by the
district court, on its facts.14 2 Moreover, it disagreed that prior circuit
decisions mandated proof of "direct, tangible, economic loss to the
victim, actual or contemplated" in cases involving an employee's
breach of duty for mail fraud. 143 Instead, the Newman court adopted
44
the more relaxed and recent standard of United States v. Dorfman1
which merely required that a fiduciary use his position to garner
secret profits in order to be prosecuted for mail fraud. 145 With respect
to the conspiracy count, the court held that it must be reinstated along
6
with the substantive counts. 14
In reinstating Newman's indictment, the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit expanded the scope of rule 10b-5, particularly in the
context of disclose-or-abstain, beyond its established boundaries. It
extended liability under the rule for reasons unrelated to the development of disclose-or-abstain in the first place, and in a manner contrary to its past application. The critical point in Newman was that
the persons or entities to whom the defendant owed a fiduciary duty
were not the same persons or entities with whom he traded securities.
The lower court's opinion delineated the reasons why this connection
was a necessary element of the offense. 147 By choosing to consider this
as an issue of standing rather than as a substantive element of the
offense, the Newman court missed a fundamental distinction.
The purchaser-seller requirement was imposed in civil damage
actions to eliminate nuisance suits where a party purchasing securities
then sues on a transaction completed beforehand.1 48 This is unrelated
to the existence of the purchaser-seller condition in disclose-or-abstain
cases. It is present there because disclose-or-abstain was formulated to
prevent insiders from profiting from their special knowlege when
buying or selling securities. Thus, the abuses disclose-or-abstain was
designed to prevent are specifically those which an insider could
inflict upon a purchaser or seller.
The issue involved in Newman is not one of plaintiff's standing to
sue but rather whether liability for failure to disclose under rule lOb-5

42 Id. Von Barta involved an employee who failed to disclose information to his employer.
Newman involved an employee who fraudulently misappropriated information entrusted to his
employer. Id.
113United States v. Courtois, No. S-81 Cr.53, slip op. at 37 (S.D.N.Y. June 5, 1981), rev'd sub
nom. United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981).
144335 F. Supp. 675 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).

145 Id. at 679.
'1
664 F.2d at 20.

147See supra notes 90-115 and accompanying text.
18 See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
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can be found against a non-insider."'4 Although the precise question
whether a duty to an employer could form the basis of a duty to
disclose or abstain to a selling shareholder was not resolved by the
Supreme Court in Chiarella, 50 the answer must be in the negative.
An employee's fiduciary duty to his employer, of itself, has no logical
connection with his duty to another party to a securities transaction.
Additional support for this view may be found in Judge Dumbauld's
concurring and dissenting opinion where he evinced doubts that the
purchaser-seller requirement should be so easily dismissed and refused
to take a postion on this issue. 5 '
Further, the Second Circuit failed to consider the Supreme
Court's careful admonition, relied upon by both the dissent in the
Second Circuit's decision in Chiarellaand the district court in dismissing Newman's indictment, that not all breaches of a fiduciary duty are
fraud under rule lOb-5. 52 Instead, it virtually lumped all types of
fraud together and placed them in the rule 10b-5 pot. 5 3 The court
seemed to rely on the clear and unmistakable presence of a fraud, and
equated it with the theoretical theft of a corporation or investor's
tangible assets. As the district court pointed out, however, the prior
cases based on misappropriation concerned situations which resulted
in a direct deprivation to an investor. In the Newman case, the
damage alleged in the indictment was to the employers as employers
54
rather than as investors. 1

Perhaps the Second Circuit was motivated by policy considerations 155 in Newman rather than by the law as it presently exists, but
given the restrictive interpretation which the Supreme Court has
accorded rule lOb-5 whenever it has considered it, Newman was
decided inconsistently with the Court's evident preference to narrow
the rule's scope. 5 One argument against extending rule lOb-5 liability to outsider defendants trading on non-inside information is that it

141 As previously noted, no precedent existed for this application. See supra notes 70-72 & 90115 and accompanying text.
10 445 U.S. at 235-36.
151664 F.2d at 20 (Dumbauld, J.,concurring and dissenting).
152 Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 472 (1977).
153 See supra notes 132-35 and accompanying text.
I, United States v. Courtois, No. S-81 Cr.53, slip op. at 21 (S.D.N.Y. June 5, 1981), rev'd sub
nom. United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981).
155Judge Meskill indicated that policy considerations were the impetus behind the Second
Circuit's affirmance of Chiarella's conviction. United States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d at 1373
(Meskill, J.,dissenting).
"1 See Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977) (breach of fiduciary duty by majority
shareholder must be in nature of manipulative or deceptive act for rule 10b-5 to apply); Ernst &
Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976) (negligence alone not sufficient to establish liability
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will open a Pandora's box of activities which would then come within
the rule. These activities might include judges' clerks trading with
knowledge derived from as yet unpublished opinions and Federal
Reserve Bank employees trading on advance information about
changed margin rates.1 57 One who fortuitously witnesses a factory
burn down, or a union member who knows that a strike is imminent
and acts upon this knowledge15 may come within the scope of the
Newman rule. Although these situations are manifestly beyond the
intended scope of section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 the logical extension of
the Newman court's rationale would embrace such activity nevertheless.
An ever broadening area of rule 10b-5 liability must eventually
result in a rule which is no rule at all. Given the fact that Newman
was properly chargeable for his fraudulent conduct under state law 159
and that there was no obstacle to his prosecution for mail fraud, 6 0 his
indictment under section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 was unnecessary as well
as improper.
The ultimate result of the Second Circuit's anomalous decision in
Newman is that persons never before vulnerable under the securities
acts are now criminally liable without explicit authorization by con-

under rule 10b-5); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975) (plaintiff must
be actual purchaser or seller in order to prosecute private damage action under rule 10b-5).
157 Note, One With Regular Access to Market Information Violates Rule l0b-5 When Trading
in Securities Without Disclosing that Information, 10 SETON HALL L. REV. 720, 737 n.113
(1980).
15' Block & Prussin, 'Outsider' Duties in Insider Trading, Nat'l L.J., Dec. 28, 1981, at 21, col.
4.
159N.Y. Bus. Corn. LAW § i611 (McKinney Cum. Supp. 1981-1982).
160 In 1954, the Supreme Court decided Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1 (1954). It there
held that the federal mail fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1976), consisted of two elements: 1) a
scheme to defraud, and 2) use of the mails for the purpose of executing the scheme. 347 U.S. 1, 8
(1954). It was unnecessary that use of the mails be an essential part of the scheme. Id. One who
acted with knowledge that use of the mails would follow in the ordinary course of business, or
who could reasonably foresee such use whether he intended it or not, caused the mails to be used
within the meaning of the statute. Id. at 8-9. In Newman's case, federal jurisdiction was
presumably invoked under the mail fraud statute on the basis of slips mailed to the defendants to
confirm their transactions or some similar use of the mails. For a discussion of this principle see
Note, Nontraditional Corporate Insiders in Possession of Material Inside Information Have a
Duty Either to Disclose the Inside Information or to Abstain from Trading in the Corporation's
Stock, 47 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 965, 966 n.2 (1979). Thus, regardless of who did the mailing, the
very fact that the mail system was used placed Newman and the others within the purview of the
mail fraud statute. That rule 10b-5 may not be properly operable here poses no problem.
Clearly, the indictment charged the defendants with a scheme to defraud, whether or not it was
such fraud as rule lOb-5 was intended to cover. The mail fraud statute has been called a "first
line of defense" against ingenious frauds which escape specific statutory prohibition. United
States v. Kelly, 507 F. Supp. 495, 498 (E.D. Pa. 1981); see also United States v. Reece, 614 F.2d
1259 (10th Cir. 1980). In each of these cases, economic harm allegedly had resulted to the
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gressional legislation. Moreover, given that one of the primary purposes of rule 10b-5 is to protect investors,'"' this application of disclose-or-abstain does not effectuate that intended purpose. An
unfortunate precedent has been set which allows rule lOb-5 to be
molded by the Government or the SEC to fit almost any fact pattern
that includes a securities transaction on the one hand and a breached
fiduciary duty on the other.
In the future, the courts will be faced with a variety of novel
situations where the Newman construction of rule lOb-5 might apply.
The Newman decision provides little guidance while prior case law
and the rule itself, in the context of corporate outsiders, provided none
at all. The SEC by amending and clarifying rule lOb-5, or Congress
by appropriate legislation, should eliminate this inevitable confusion
and settle the question in the proper forum.
Jacqueline Grindrod

employer; in Kelly, however, that apparently was not considered a necessary element of the
crime.
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit noted in United States v. Von Barta, 635 F.2d
999 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 998 (1981), that varying approaches to interpreting the
mail fraud statute had been taken in different jurisdictions. Id. at 1005. It chose to rest its
decision that the statute applied on "special circumstances," specifically, Von Barta's experience,
his employer's request that he advise the employer of adverse developments, and Von Barta's
position of "great trust" and considerable power. Id. at 1007. These circumstances were the
source of Von Barta's duty to disclose. Prior to that decision was United States v. Dorfman, 335
F. Supp. 675 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). That case held that breach of trust of a fiduciary using his
position to make secret profits was fraud within the meaning of the mail fraud statute and that
actually obtaining money from the victim was unnecessary. Id. This case buttressed the Newman
court's decision to reinstate the mail fraud charges. See 664 F.2d at 20.
161 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1976); see also Desser v. Ashton, 408 F. Supp. 1174, 1176 (S.D.N.Y.
1975), aft'd, 573 F.2d 1289 (2d Cir. 1977); United Sportfishers v. Buffo, 396 F. Supp. 310, 312
(S.D. Cal. 1975), aff'd, 597 F.2d 658 (9th Cir. 1978).

